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ABSTRACT
We analyze reported patches for three existing generate-and-
validate patch generation systems (GenProg, RSRepair, and
AE). The basic principle behind generate-and-validate sys-
tems is to accept only plausible patches that produce correct
outputs for all inputs in the test suite used to validate the
patches.
Because of errors in the patch evaluation infrastructure,
the majority of the reported patches are not plausible —
they do not produce correct outputs even for the inputs in
the validation test suite. The overwhelming majority of the
reported patches are not correct and are equivalent to a sin-
gle modification that simply deletes functionality. Observed
negative effects include the introduction of security vulner-
abilities and the elimination of desirable standard function-
ality.
We also present Kali, a generate-and-validate patch gener-
ation system that only deletes functionality. Working with a
simpler and more effectively focused search space, Kali gen-
erates at least as many correct patches as prior GenProg,
RSRepair, and AE systems. Kali also generates at least as
many patches that produce correct outputs for the inputs in
the validation test suite as the three prior systems.
We also discuss patches produced by ClearView, a generate-
and-validate binary hot patching system that leverages learned
invariants to produce patches that enable systems to survive
otherwise fatal defects and security attacks. Our analysis
indicates that ClearView successfully patches 9 of the 10 se-
curity vulnerabilities used to evaluate the system. At least
4 of these patches are correct.
1. INTRODUCTION
Automatic patch generation holds out the promise of cor-
recting defects in production software systems without the
time and expense required for human developers to under-
stand, triage, and correct these defects. The prominent
generate-and-validate approach starts with a test suite of
inputs, at least one of which exposes a defect in the soft-
ware. The patch generation system applies program mod-
ifications to generate a space of candidate patches, then
searches the generated patch space to find plausible patches
— i.e., patches that produce correct outputs for all inputs
in the test suite. In this paper we start by considering the
GenProg [24], RSRepair [44], and AE [56] systems.
The reported results for these systems are impressive:
GenProg is reported to fix 55 of 105 considered bugs [24],
RSRepair is reported to fix all 24 of 24 considered bugs
(these bugs are a subset of the 55 bugs that GenProg is re-
ported to fix) [44], and AE is reported to fix 54 of the same
105 considered bugs [56].1 If these results are accurate, these
systems represent a significant step forward in our ability to
automatically eliminate defects in large software systems.
1.1 Plausibility Analysis and Weak Proxies
Motivated to better understand the capabilities and po-
tential of these systems, we performed an analysis of the
patches that these systems produce. Enabled by the avail-
ability of the generated patches and the relevant patch gen-
eration and validation infrastructure [7, 5, 3, 8, 1], our anal-
ysis was driven by the following research questions:
RQ1: Do the reported GenProg, RSRepair, and
AE patches produce correct outputs for the in-
puts in the test suite used to validate the patch?
The basic principle behind generate-and-validate systems
is to only accept plausible patches that produce correct out-
puts for all inputs in the test suite used to validate the
patches. Despite this principle, our analysis shows that be-
cause of errors in the patch validation infrastructure, many
of the reported patches are, in fact, not plausible – they do
not produce correct outputs even for the inputs in the test
suite used to validate the patch.
For 37 of the 55 defects that GenProg is reported to re-
pair [24], none of the reported patches produce correct out-
puts for the inputs in the test suite. For 14 of the 24 defects
that RSRepair is reported to repair [44], none of the re-
ported patches that we analyze produce correct outputs for
the inputs in the test suite. And for 27 of the 54 defects
reported in the AE result tar file [1], none of the reported
patches produces correct outputs.
Further investigation indicates that weak proxies are the
source of the error. A weak proxy is an acceptance test that
does not check that the patched program produces correct
output. It instead checks for a weaker property that may
(or may not) indicate correct execution. Specifically, some
of the acceptance tests check only if the patched program
produces an exit code of 0. If so, they accept the patch
(whether the output is correct or not).
Because of weak proxies, all of these systems violate the
underlying basic principle of generate-and-validate patch gen-
eration. The result is that the majority of the patches ac-
1Our analysis of the commit logs and applications indicates
that 36 of these bugs correspond to deliberate functionality
changes, not actual bugs. That is, for 36 of these bugs,
there is no actual bug to fix. To simplify the presentation,
however, we refer to all of the 105 bugs as defects.
cepted by these systems do not generate correct outputs even
for the inputs in the validation test suite. See Section 3.
1.2 Correctness Analysis
Despite multiple publications that analyze the reported
patches and the methods used to generate them [24, 44, 56,
37, 21, 28, 45, 19], we were able to find no systematic patch
correctness analysis. We therefore analyzed the remaining
plausible patches to determine if they eliminated the defect
or not.
RQ2: Are any of the reported GenProg, RSRe-
pair, and AE patches correct?
The overwhelming majority of the patches are not correct.
Specifically, GenProg produced a correct patch for only 2 of
the 105 considered defects.2 Similarly, RSRepair produced
a correct patch for only 2 of the 24 considered defects. AE
produced a correct patch for only 3 of the 105 considered
defects. For each of the incorrect patches, we have a test
case that exposes the defect in the patch [46]. Because of
weak proxies, many of these test cases were already present
in the existing test suites. For the remaining plausible but
incorrect patches, we developed new test cases that exposed
the defects. See Section 4.
1.3 Stronger Test Suites
One hypothesis is that stronger test suites with additional
inputs that provide better coverage would enable these sys-
tems to generate more correct patches:
RQ3: Do stronger test suites enable GenProg to
produce more correct patches?
To investigate this question, we reran all of the GenProg
runs that generated incorrect patches. We used corrected
test scripts and enhanced test suites that contained defect-
exposing test cases for all of these patches. These reexe-
cutions produced no patches at all. We next discuss two
potential explanations for this result.
Search Space: A necessary prerequisite for the success
of any search-based patch generation algorithm is a search
space that contains successful patches. One potential ex-
planation is that the GenProg, RSRepair, and AE search
spaces do not contain correct patches for these defects. This
explanation is consistent with recent results from the staged
program repair (SPR) project, whose search space contains
correct patches for 20 of the 105 defects in the GenProg
benchmark set [30, 31]. Only 3 of these correct patches are
within the GenProg search space.
Random Genetic Search: Another potential explanation
is that these systems do not use a search algorithm that can
explore the search space efficiently enough. GenProg’s ge-
netic search algorithm uses the number of passed test cases
as the fitness function. For most of the defects in the bench-
mark set, there is only one negative test case (so even the
unpatched program passes all but one of the test cases).
With this fitness function, the difference between the fitness
of the unpatched code and the fitness of a plausible patch
that passes all test cases is only one. There is therefore no
2We note that the paper discusses only two patches: one of
the correct patches for one of these two defects and a patch
that is obtained with the aid of user annotations [24].
smooth gradient for the genetic search to traverse to find a
solution. In this situation, genetic search can easily devolve
into random search. Indeed, RSRepair (which uses random
search) is reported to find patches more quickly and with
less trials than GenProg [44]. See Section 5.
1.4 Functionality Deletion
As we analyzed patch correctness, it became clear that
(despite some surface syntactic complexity), the overwhelm-
ing majority of the plausible patches were semantically quite
simple. Specifically, they were equivalent to a single func-
tionality deletion modification, either the deletion of a single
line or block of code or the insertion of a single return or exit
statement.
RQ4: How many of the plausible reported Gen-
Prog, RSRepair, and AE patches are equivalent
to a single functionality deletion modification?
Our analysis indicates that 104 of the 110 plausible Gen-
Prog patches, 37 of the 44 plausible RSRepair patches, and
22 of the 27 plausible AE patches are equivalent to a single
modification that deletes functionality.
Our analysis also indicates that (in contrast to previously
reported results [27]) the plausible patches had significant
negative effects, including the introduction of new integer
and buffer overflow security vulnerabilities and the elimi-
nation of standard desriable functionality. These negative
effects highlight some of the risks associated with the com-
bination of functionality deletion and generate-and-validate
patch generation. See Section 6.
Despite their potential for negative effects, functionality
deletion patches can be useful in helping developers locate
and better understand defects. For this purppose, we advo-
cate using a system that focuses solely on functionality dele-
tion (as opposed to a system that aspires to create correct
patches). Such an approach has at least two advantages.
First, it is substantially simpler than approaches that at-
tempt to generate more complex repairs. The search space
can therefore be smaller, simpler, and searched more effi-
ciently. Second, focusing solely on functionality deletion
can produce simpler, more transparent patches for devel-
opers who want to use the patches to help them locate and
better understand defects.
1.5 Original GenProg
Our analysis of the original GenProg system [57, 20] (win-
ner of a distinguished paper award at ICSE 2009 and a best
paper award at GECCO 2009) yields similar results. Out of
11 defects evaluated in the two papers, the generated patches
for 9 defects are incorrect (in some cases because of the use
of weak proxies, in other cases because of weak test suites).
The patches for 9 of the 11 defects simply delete function-
ality (removing statements, adding return statements, or
adding exit statements). The only two defects for which
the original GenProg system generates correct patches are
small motivating examples (less than 30 lines of code). See
Section 7.
1.6 Revisiting Hypotheses and Explanations
At this point there is a substantial number of papers that
present hypotheses and explanations related to phenomena
associated with the GenProg, RSRepair, and AE automated
patch generation systems. We next revisit some of these
hypotheses and explanations in light of the results presented
in this paper.
Simple vs. Complex Patches: Previous papers have
considered (but not satisfactorily answered) the following
question: “why is GenProg typically able to produce simple
patches for bugs when humans used complex patches?” [56,
24]. The results in this paper provide additional insight into
this question: the simple GenProg patches are not correct —
they either fail to produce correct outputs even for the inputs
in the validation test suite, or they simply remove lightly
tested functionality. Humans used complex patches because
complex patches are required to eliminate the defect. This
fact highlights how test suites that may be suitable for hu-
man developers may not be suitable for automated patch
generation systems that operate with less context.
Targeted Defect Classes: In an essay in ICSE 2014, Mon-
perrus focuses on the importance of “target defect classes,”
i.e., the set of defects for which the technique is designed
to work [37]. He notes that the GenProg research does
not explicitly address the question, but observes “hints that
GenProg works best for manipulating defensive code against
memory errors (in particular segmentation faults and buffer
overruns)” [37]. Our results indicate that the defect class for
which GenProg works best is defects that can be repaired
with a single modification that deletes functionality. And
while some of the patches do manipulate defensive code, ob-
served effects include the deletion of critical checks and the
introduction of new segmentation faults and buffer overruns.
Human Patch Acceptability: A paper investigating the
developer maintainability of a subset of the GenProg patches
found “statistically significant evidence” that the GenProg
patches “can be maintained with equal accuracy and less ef-
fort than the code produced by human-written patches” [21].
In retrospect, this potentially surprising result may become
more plausible when one considers that the majority of the
GenProg patches are equivalent to a single functionality
deletion modification.
The evaluation focused on asking human developers a va-
riety of questions designed to be relevant to maintainability
tasks [21]. There is no indication if any of the developers
thought that the patches were incorrect. The motivation
for the paper, referencing GenProg patches (among others),
states “while these patches may be functionally correct, lit-
tle effort has been taken to date to evaluate the understand-
ability of the resulting code”. We note that the referenced
patches are not functionally correct, and question the rele-
vance of a human evaluation of patch understandability that
does not expose the obvious incorrectness of the patches.
Time and Effort: The GenProg, RSRepair, and AE re-
search projects devoted significant time and effort to evalu-
ating variants of the basic GenProg patch generation mech-
anisms [24, 19, 28, 44, 56]. The results presented in this
paper show that (at least for the considered benchmark de-
fects) all of the time and effort invested in developing, eval-
uating, analyzing, and evolving these mechanisms only pro-
duced complex systems whose patches are no better than
those generated by the much simpler Kali patch generation
mechanism (which simply deletes functionality).
Community Perception: It is our understanding that
the broader software engineering community may under-
stand (incorrectly) that the GenProg patches actually fix
the defects. Example quotes that reflect this understand-
ing include “We selected GenProg for the reason that it is
almost the only state-of-the-art automated repair tool hav-
ing the ability of fixing real-world, large-scale C faulty pro-
grams” [45] and“in an evaluation of GenProg, a state-of-the-
art repair approach guided by genetic programming, this ap-
proach repaired 55 out of 105 defects” [34]. We believe that
this understanding should be revisited in light of the results
presented in this paper.
1.7 Realistic Patch Generation Expectations
Given this backdrop, what can one realistically expect
from automatic patch generation systems moving forward?
Currently available evidence indicates that improvements
will require both 1) the use of richer search spaces with more
correct patches and 2) the use of more effective search algo-
rithms that can search the space more efficiently.
Perhaps most importantly, our results highlight important
differences between machine-generated and human-generated
patches. Even the plausible GenProg, AE, and RSRepair
patches are overwhelming incorrect and simply remove func-
tionality. The human-generated patches for the same de-
fects, in contrast, are typically correct and usually modify
or introduce new program logic. This result indicates that
information other than simply passing a validation test suite
is (at least with current test suites) important for producing
correct patches.
Automatic Code Transfer: One way to obtain correct
code is to obtain it from another application. Working
with an input that exposes a potential security vulnerability,
CodePhage searches an application database to automati-
cally locate and transfer code that eliminates the vulnera-
bility [52, 51]. CodePhage successfully repaired 10 defects
in 7 recipient applications via code transfer from 5 donor
applications.
Learning From Successful Patches: Another way to ob-
tain additional information is to learn from successful human
patches. Prophet [29] analyzes a large database of revision
changes extracted from open source project repositories to
automatically learn features of successful patches. It then
uses these features to recognize and prioritize correct patches
within a larger space of candidate patches. On the GenProg
benchmark set, Prophet generates correct patches for 14 de-
fects (12 more than GenProg and 11 more than AE).
Learned Invariants: Successful executions are yet another
source of useful information. Learning data structure con-
sistency specifications from successful executions can enable
successful data structure repair [13]. ClearView [43] observes
successful executions to dynamically learn and enforce in-
variants that characterize successful executions. ClearView
automatically generates successful patches that eliminate se-
curity vulnerabilities in 9 of 10 evaluated defects [43].
Targeted Patch Generation: Another source of informa-
tion is to identify a specific set of defects and apply tech-
niques that target that set of defects. Researchers have suc-
cessfully targeted out of bounds accesses [49, 9, 38], null
pointer dereferences [32, 17], divide by zero errors [32], mem-
ory leaks [40, 23], infinite loops [10, 26, 33], and integer and
buffer overflows [53]. For the defects in scope, a targeted
technique tends to generate patches with better quality than
a search-based technique. For example, RCV [32], a recovery
tool for divide-by-zero and null-dereference defects, success-
fully enables applications to recover from the majority of the
systematically collected 18 CVE defects so that they exhibit
identical behavior as the developer-patched application.
Specifications: Specifications, when available, can enable
patch generation systems to produce patches that are guar-
anteed to be correct. AutoFix-E produces semantically sound
candidate bug patches with the aid of a design-by-contract
programming language (Eiffel) [54]. CodeHint uses partial
specifications to automatically synthesize code fragments
with the specified behavior [22]. Data structure repair tech-
niques detect the inconsistency between a data structure
state and a set of specified model constraints and enforce the
violated constraints to repair the data structure state [14].
Realistic Expectations: By combining more productive
search spaces and search algorithms with the exploitation
of additional information other than generating correct out-
puts on a validation test suite, we expect future systems to
be able to generate successful patches for defects that can
be fixed with small changes (via search-based techniques)
and defects that follow specific patterns (via targeted tech-
niques).
1.8 Kali
Inspired by the observation that the patches for the vast
majority of the defects that GenProg, RSRepair, and AE
were able to address consisted (semantically) of a single
functionality deletion modification, we implemented a new
system, the Kali automatic patch generation system, that fo-
cuses only on removing functionality. Kali generates patches
that either 1) delete a single line or block of code, 2) replace
an if condition with true or false (forcing the then or else
branch to always execute), or 3) insert a single return state-
ment into a function body. Kali accepts a patch if it gener-
ates correct outputs on all inputs in the validation test suite.
Our hypothesis was that by focusing directly on functional-
ity removal, we would be able to obtain a simpler system
that was at least as effective in practice.
RQ5: How effective is Kali in comparison with
existing generate-and-validate patch generation
systems?
Our results show that Kali is more effective than GenProg,
RSRepair, and AE. Specifically, Kali finds correct patches
for at least as many defects (3 for Kali vs. 3 for AE and
2 for GenProg and RSRepair) and plausible patches for at
least as many defects (27 for Kali vs. 18 for GenProg, 10 for
RSRepair, and 27 for AE). And Kali works with a simpler
and more focused search space.
Efficiency and Automatic Operation: An efficient search
space is important for automatic operation. An examina-
tion of the GenProg patch generation infrastructure indi-
cates that GenProg (and presumably RSRepair and AE)
require the developer to specify the source code file to at-
tempt to patch [6]. This requirement significantly reduces
the size of the patch search space, but also prevents these
prior systems from operating automatically without devel-
oper involvement. Kali, in contrast, is efficient enough to
operate fully automatically without requiring the developer
to specify a target source code file to attempt to patch.
RQ6: Can Kali provide useful information about
software defects?
Although Kali is more effective than GenProg, RSRepair,
and AE at finding correct patches, it is not so much more
effective that we would advocate using it for this purpose
(any more than we would advocate using any of these pre-
vious systems to find correct patches). But Kali’s plausible
patches can still be useful:
• Enhanced Defect Reports: Previous research indi-
cates that developers are more likely to fix defects if
they come with sample patches that show how to elim-
inate the defect for sample defect-exposing inputs [55].
Kali provides an efficient way to obtain such patches
without requiring model-checking and policy specifica-
tion information as in prior research [55].
• Defect Location and Characteristics: An exam-
ination of the Kali patches provides insight into why
including patches may promote more productive defect
reports. The Kali patches often precisely pinpoint the
exact line or lines of code to change. And they almost
always provide insight into the defective functionality,
the cause of the defect, and how to correct the defect.
1.9 Research Result Availability
We were able to perform the research in this paper be-
cause the reported GenProg, RSRepair, and AE patches
(along with the GenProg patch generation and evaluation
infrastructure) were available online [7, 3, 5, 1, 8]. This pa-
per therefore supports a move to greater transparency and
availability of reported experimental results and systems.
The Kali and ClearView patches, new test cases, and the
plausibility, correctness, and functionality deletion analyses
are all available [46]. Kali is available on request for the
purpose of checking the results presented in this paper.
The PAR system (winner of a best paper award at ICSE
2013) is another prominent generate-and-validate automatic
patch generation system [25]. We do not include PAR in this
study because (despite repeated requests to the authors of
the PAR paper), we were unable to obtain the PAR patches.
1.10 Contributions
This paper makes the following contributions:
• Plausibility Analysis: It shows that the majority
of the reported GenProg, RSRepair, and AE patches,
contrary to the basic principle of generate-and-validate
patch generation, do not produce correct outputs even
for the inputs in the test suite used to validate the
patches.
• Weak Proxies: It identifies weak proxies, acceptance
tests that do not check that the patched application
produces the correct output, as the cause of the re-
ported implausible patches.
• Correctness Analysis: It shows that the overwhelm-
ing majority of the reported patches are not correct
and that these incorrect patches can have significant
negative effects including the introduction of new se-
curity vulnerabilities and the elimination of desirable
standard functionality.
• Stronger Test Suites Don’t Help: It shows that
stronger test suites do not help GenProg produce cor-
rect patches — they simply eliminate the ability of
GenProg to produce any patches at all.
• Semantic Patch Analysis: It reports, for the first
time, that the overwhelming majority of the plausible
GenProg, RSRepair, and AE patches are semantically
equivalent to a single modification that simply deletes
functionality from the application.
• Kali: It presents a novel automatic patch generation
system, Kali, that works only with simple patches that
delete functionality.
• Kali Results: It presents results that show that Kali
outperforms GenProg, RSRepair, and AE. With a sim-
pler search space and no identification of a target source
code file to patch, Kali generates at least as many cor-
rect patches and at least as many plausible patches
as these prior systems. Even though the majority of
these patches are not correct, they successfully target
the defective functionality, can help pinpoint the de-
fective code, and often provide insight into important
defect characteristics.
2. OVERVIEW OF ANALYZED SYSTEMS
GenProg: GenProg combines three basic modifications,
specifically delete, insert, and replace, into larger patches,
then uses genetic programming to search the resulting patch
space. We work with the GenProg system used to perform
a “systematic study of automated program repair” that “in-
cludes two orders of magnitude more”source code, test cases,
and defects than previous studies [24]. As of the submis-
sion date of this paper, the relevant GenProg paper is refer-
enced on the GenProg web site as the recommended start-
ing point for researchers interested in learning more about
GenProg [4]. The GenProg patch evaluation infrastructure
works with the following kinds of components [7, 5, 3]:
• Test Cases: Individual tests that exercise functional-
ity in the patched application. Examples include php
scripts (which are then evaluated by a patched version
of php), bash scripts that invoke patched versions of
the libtiff tools on specific images, and perl scripts that
generate HTTP requests (which are then processed by
a patched version of lighttpd).
• Test Scripts: Scripts that run the application on a
set of test cases and report either success (if the ap-
plication passes all of the test cases) or failure (if the
application does not pass at least one test case).
• Test Harnesses: Scripts or programs that evaluate
candidate patches by running the relevant test script
or scripts on the patched application, then reporting
the results (success or failure) back to GenProg.
It is our understanding that the test cases and test scripts
were adopted from the existing software development efforts
for each of the benchmark GenProg applications and imple-
mented by the developers of these projects for the purpose of
testing code written by human developers working on these
applications. The test harnesses were implemented by the
GenProg developers as part of the GenProg project.
A downloadable virtual machine [7], all of the patches re-
ported in the relevant GenProg paper (these include patches
from 10 GenProg executions for each defect) [5], source code
for each application, test cases, test scripts, and the GenProg
test harness for each application [3] are all publicly available.
Together, these components make it possible to apply each
patch and run the test scripts or even the patched version
of each application on the provided test cases. It is also
possible to run GenProg itself.
RSRepair: The goal of the RSRepair project was to com-
pare the effectiveness of genetic programming with random
search [44]. To this end, the RSRepair system built on the
GenProg system, using the same testing and patch evalua-
tion infrastructure but changing the search algorithm from
genetic search to random search. RSRepair was evaluated on
24 of the 55 defects that GenProg was reported to repair [44,
24]. The reported patches are publicly available [8]. For each
defect, the RSRepair paper reports patches from 100 runs.
We analyze the first 5 patches from these 100 runs.
AE: AE is an extension to GenProg that uses a patch equiv-
alence analysis to avoid repeated testing of patches that
are syntactically different but equivalent (according to an
approximate patch equivalence test) [56]. AE focuses on
patches that only perform one edit and exhaustively enumer-
ates all such patches. The AE experiments were “designed
for direct comparison with previous GenProg results” [56,
24] and evaluate AE on the same set of 105 defects. The pa-
per reports one patch per repaired defect, with the patches
publicly available [1]. AE is based on GenProg and we were
able to leverage the developer test scripts available in the
GenProg distribution to compile and execute the reported
AE patches.
3. PLAUSIBILITY ANALYSIS
The basic principle behind the GenProg, RSRepair, and
AE systems is to generate patches that produce correct re-
sults for all of the inputs in the test suite used to validate
the patches. We investigate the following research question:
RQ1: Do the reported GenProg, RSRepair, and
AE patches produce correct results for the inputs
in the test suite used to validate the patch?
To investigate this question, we downloaded the reported
patches and validation test suites [7, 5, 3, 8, 1]. We then ap-
plied the patches, recompiled the patched applications, ran
the patched applications on the inputs in the validation test
suites, and compared the outputs with the correct outputs.
Our results show that the answer to RQ1 is that the major-
ity of the reported GenProg, RSRepair, and AE patches do
not produce correct outputs for the inputs in the validation
test suite:
• GenProg: Of the reported 414 GenProg patches, only
110 are plausible — the remaining 304 generate incor-
rect results for at least one input in the test suite used
to validate the patch. This leaves 18 defects with at
least one plausible patch.
• RSRepair: Of the considered 120 AE patches, only
44 are plausible — the remaining 76 generate incorrect
results for at least one input in the test suite used to
validate the patch. This leaves 10 defects with at least
one plausible patch.
• AE: Of the reported 54 AE patches, only 27 are plau-
sible — the remaining 27 generate incorrect results for
at least one input in the test suite. This leaves 27
defects with at least one plausible patch.
Test Harness Issues: The GenProg 2012 paper reports
that GenProg found successful patches for 28 of 44 defects in
php [24]. The results tarball contains a total of 196 patches
for these 28 defects. Only 29 of these patches (for 5 of
the 44 defects, specifically defects php-bug-307931-307934,
php-bug-309892-309910, php-bug-309986-310009, php-bug-
310011-310050, and php-bug-310673-310681) are plausible.
GenProg accepts the remaining 167 patches because of in-
tegration issues between the GenProg test harness and the
developer test script.
For php, the developer test script is also written in php.
The GenProg test harness executes this developer test script
using the version of php with the current GenProg patch
under evaluation applied, not the standard version of php.
The current patch under evaluation can therefore influence
the behavior of the developer test script (and not just the
behavior of the test cases).
The GenProg test harness does not check that the php
patches cause the developer test scripts to produce the cor-
rect result. It instead uses a weak proxy that checks only that
the higher order 8 bits of the exit code from the developer
test script are 0. This can happen 1) if the test script itself
crashes with a segmentation fault (because of an error in the
patched version of php that the test case exercises), 2) if the
current patch under evaluation causes the test script (which
is written in php) to exit with exit code 0 even though one of
the test cases fails, or 3) if all of the test cases pass. Of the
167 accepted patches, 138 are implausible — only 29 pass
all of the test cases.
We next present relevant test infrastructure code. The
GenProg test harness is written in C. The following lines
determine if the test harness accepts a patch. Line 8564
runs the test case and shifts off the lower 8 bits of the exit
code. Line 8566 accepts the patch if the remaining upper 8
bits of the exit code are zero.
php-run-test.c:8564 int res = system(buffer) >> 8
php-run-test.c:8565
php-run-test.c:8566 if (res == 0) { /* accept patch */
Here buffer contains the following shell command:
./sapi/cli/php ../php-helper.php -p
./sapi/cli/php -q <php test file>
where ./sapi/cli/php is the patched version of the php
interpreter. This patched version is used both to run the
php test file for the test case and the php-helper.php script
that runs the test case.
Test Script Issues: The GenProg libtiff test scripts do
not check that the test cases produce the correct output.
They instead check that the exercised libtiff tools return
exit code 0. The test scripts may therefore accept patches
that do not produce the correct output. There is a libtiff test
script for each test case; 73 of the 78 libtiff test scripts check
only the exit code. This issue causes GenProg to accept
137 implausible libtiff patches (out of a total of 155 libtiff
patches). libtiff and php together account for 322 of the
total 414 patches that the GenProg paper reports [24].
One of the gmp test scripts does not check that all of the
output components are correct (despite this issue, both gmp
patches are plausible).
AE: The reported AE patches exhibit plausibility problems
that are consistent with the use of weak proxies in the Gen-
Prog testing infrastructure. Specifically, only 5 of the 17 re-
ported libtiff patches and 7 of the reported 22 php patches
are plausible.
RSRepair: RSRepair uses the same testing infrastructure
as GenProg [44]. Presumably because of weak proxy prob-
lems inherited from the GenProg testing infrastructure, the
reported RSRepair patches exhibit similar plausibility prob-
lems. Only 5 of the 75 RSRepair libtiff patches are plausible.
All of these 5 patches repair the same defect, specifically
libtiff-bug-d13be72c-ccadf48a. The RSRepair paper reports
patches for only 1 php defect, specifically php-bug-309892-
309910, the 1 php defect for which all three systems are able
to generate a correct patch.
4. CORRECTNESS ANALYSIS
We next discuss our analysis of the following research
question:
RQ2: Are any of the reported GenProg, RSRe-
pair, and AE patches correct?
We analyze the correctness of each patch by analyzing the
patch in context and determining if it correctly repairs the
defect.
Patch Correctness Results: Our analysis indicates that
only 5 of the 414 GenProg patches (3 for python-bug-69783-
69784 and 2 for php-bug-309892-309910) are correct. This
leaves GenProg with correct patches for 2 out of 105 de-
fects. Only 4 of the 120 RSRepair patches (2 for python-
bug-69783-69784 and 2 for php-bug-309892-309910) are cor-
rect. This leaves RSRepair with correct patches for 2 out
of 24 defects. Only 3 of the 54 AE patches (1 for php-
bug-309111-309159, 1 for php-bug-309892-309910, and 1 for
python-bug-69783-69784) are correct. This leaves AE with
correct patches for 3 out of 54 defects.
For each plausible but incorrect patch that GenProg or AE
generate, and each plausible but incorrect RSRepair patch
that we analyze, we developed a new test case that exposes
the defect in the incorrect patch [46].
Patch Correctness Clarity: We acknowledge that, in
general, determining whether a specific patch corrects a spe-
cific defect can be difficult (or in some cases not even well
defined). We emphasize that this is not the case for the
patches and defects that we consider here. The correct be-
havior for all of the defects is clear, as is patch correctness
and incorrectness.
Developer Patch Comparison: For each defect, the Gen-
Prog benchmark suite identifies a corrected version of the
application that does not have the defect. In most cases the
corrected version is a later version produced by a developer
writing an explicit developer patch to repair the error. In
other cases the corrected version simply applies a deliberate
functionality change — there was no defect in the original
version of the application. In yet other cases the identi-
fied correct version is an earlier version of the application.
In these cases, it is possible to derive an implicit developer
patch that reverts the application back to the earlier version.
Our analysis indicates that the developer patches are, in
general, consistent with our correctness analysis. Specifi-
cally, 1) if our analysis indicates that the reported GenProg,
RSRepair, or AE patch is correct, then the patch has the
same semantics as the developer patch, 2) if our analysis in-
dicates that the reported GenProg, RSRepair, or AE patch
is not correct, then the patch has different semantics than
the developer patch, and 3) if we developed a new test case
to invalidate generated plausible but incorrect patches for a
defect, the corresponding developer patched version of the
application produces correct output for the new input.
python-bug-69783-69784: Figure 2 (see Appendix A)
presents the GenProg patch for python-bug-69783-69784.
Figure 3 presents the developer patch. Both of the patches
remove an if statement (lines 1-25 in Figure 3, lines 1-52 in
Figure 2). Because GenProg generates preprocessed code,
the GenProg patch is larger than but semantically equiva-
lent to the developer patch. AE and RSRepair also gener-
ate correct patches that are semantically equivalent to this
GenProg patch. Note that python-bug-69783-69784 is in
fact not a bug. It instead corresponds to a deliberate func-
tionality change. The relevant code (correctly) implemented
python support for two-year dates. This functionality was
deliberately removed by the developer in revision 69784.
php-bug-309892-309910: Figure 4 (see Appendix A)
presents the GenProg patch for php-bug-309892-309910.
Figure 5 presents the developer patch. Both of the patches
remove an obsolete check implemented by the deleted if
statement (lines 14-18 in Figure 4 and lines 7-9 in Figure 5).
AE and RSRepair generate semantically equivalent patches.
php-bug-309111-309159: Figure 6 (see Appendix A)
presents the AE patch for php-bug-309111-309159. Figure 7
presents the developer patch. php-309111-309159 is an url
parsing defect — the PHP function parse url() may incor-
rectly parse urls that contain question marks. The AE patch
(with __genprog_mutant equal to 25) copies the if state-
ment (lines 23-29 of Figure 6) to the location after the as-
signment p = pp. Therefore p is equal to pp when the copied
block executes. In this context, the copied block is semanti-
cally equivalent to the block that the developer patch adds
before the assignment statement. In the AE patch, the code
involving __genprog_mutant works with the AE test in-
frastructure to compile multiple generated patches into the
same file for later dynamic selection by the AE test infras-
tructure.
5. GENPROG REEXECUTIONS
We next consider the following research question:
RQ3: Do stronger test suites enable GenProg to
produce more correct patches?
To determine whether GenProg [24] is able to generate
correct patches if we correct the issues in the patch evalua-
tion infrastructure and provide GenProg with stronger test
suites, we perform the following GenProg reexecutions:
Corrected Patch Evaluation Infrastructure: We first
corrected the GenProg patch evaluation infrastructure is-
sues (see Section 3). Specifically, we modified the php test
harness to ensure that the harness correctly runs the test
script and correctly reports the results back to GenProg.
We strengthened the 73 libtiff test scripts to, as appropri-
ate, compare various metadata components and/or the gen-
erated image output with the correct output. We modified
the gmp test scripts to check all output components.
Augmented Test Suites: We augmented the GenProg
test suites to include the new test cases (see Section 4) that
expose the defects in the plausible but incorrect GenProg
patches.
GenProg Reexecution: For each combination of defect
and random seed for which GenProg generated an incorrect
patch, we reexecuted GenProg with that same combination.
These reexecutions used the corrected patch evaluation in-
frastructure and the augmented test suites.
Results: These reexecutions produced 13 new patches (for
defects libtiff-bug-5b02179-3dfb33b and lighttpd-bug-2661-
2662). Our analysis indicates that the new patches that
GenProg generated for these two defects are plausible but
incorrect. We therefore developed two new test cases that
exposed the defects in these new incorrect patches. We in-
cluded these new test cases in the test suites and reexecuted
GenProg again. With these test suites, the GenProg reexe-
cutions produced no patches at all. The new test cases are
available [46].
6. SEMANTIC PATCH ANALYSIS
For each plausible patch, we manually analyzed the patch
in context to determine if it was semantically equivalent to
either 1) the deletion of a single statement or block of code,
or 2) the insertion of a single return or exit statement. This
analysis enabled us to answer the following research ques-
tion:
RQ4: Are the reported GenProg, RSRepair, and
AE patches equivalent to a single modification
that simply deletes functionality?
Our analysis indicates that the overwhelming majority of
the reported plausible patches are equivalent to a single func-
tionality deletion modification. Specifically, 104 of the 110
plausible GenProg patches, 37 of the plausible 44 RSRepair
patches, and 22 of the plausible 27 AE patches are equiv-
alent to a single deletion or return insertion modification.
Note that even though AE contains analyses that attempt
to determine if two patches are equivalent, the analyses are
based on relatively shallow criteria (syntactic equality, dead
code elimination, and equivalent sequences of independent
instructions) that do not necessarily recognize the function-
ality deletion equivalence of syntactically complex sequences
of instructions. Indeed, the AE paper, despite its focus on
semantic patch equivalence, provides no indication that the
overwhelming majority of the reported patches are semanti-
cally equivalent to a single functionality deletion modifica-
tion [56].
6.1 Weak Test Suites
During our analysis, we obtained a deeper understanding
of why so many plausible patches simply delete functional-
ity. A common scenario is that one of the test cases exercises
a defect in functionality that is otherwise unexercised. The
patch simply deletes functionality that the test case exer-
cises. This deletion then impairs or even completely removes
the functionality.
These results highlight the fact that weak test suites — i.e.,
test suites that provide relatively limited coverage — may
be appropriate for human developers (who operate with a
broader understanding of the application and are motivated
to produce correct patches) but (in the absence of additional
techniques designed to enhance their ability to produce cor-
rect patches) not for automatic patch generation systems
that aspire to produce correct patches.
6.2 Impact of Functionality Deletion Patches
Our analysis of the patches also indicated that (in contrast
to previously reported results [27]) the combination of test
suites with limited coverage and support for functionality
deletion can promote the generation of patches with negative
effects such as the introduction of security vulnerabilities
and the elimination of standard functionality.
Check Elimination: Several defects are caused by incor-
rectly coded checks. The test suite contains a test case that
causes the check to fire incorrectly, but there is no test case
that relies on the check to fire correctly. The generated
patches simply remove the check. The consequences vary
depending on the nature of the check. For example:
• Integer Overflow: libtiff-bug-0860361d-1ba75257 in-
correctly implements an integer overflow check. The
generated patches remove the check, in effect reintro-
ducing a security vulnerability from a previous version
of libtiff (CVE-2006-2025) that a remote attacker can
exploit to execute arbitrary injected code [2].
• Buffer Overflow: Defect fbc-bug-5458-5459 corre-
sponds to an overly conservative check that prevents
a buffer overflow. The generated patches remove the
check, enabling the buffer overflow.
Standard Feature Elimination: Defects php-bug-
307931-307934, gzip-bug-3fe0ca-39a362, lighttpd-bug-1913-
1914, lighttpd-bug-2330-2331 correspond to incorrectly han-
dled cases in standard functionality. The test suite contains
a test case that exposes the incorrectly handled case, but
no test case that exercises the standard functionality. The
patches impair or remove the functionality, leaving the pro-
gram unable to process standard use cases (such as decom-
pressing non-zero files or initializing associative array ele-
ments to integer values).
Undefined Accesses: Patches often remove initialization
code. While the resulting undefined accesses may happen to
return values that enable the patch to pass the test cases, the
patches can be fragile — different environments can produce
values that cause the patch to fail (e.g., the AE patch for
fbc-bug-5458-5459).
Deallocation Elimination: The patches for wireshark-
bug-37112-37111 and php-bug-310011-310050 eliminate
memory management errors by removing relevant memory
deallocations. While this typically introduces a memory
leak, it can also enhance survival by postponing the fail-
ure until the program runs out of memory (which may never
happen). We note that human developers often work around
difficult memory management defects by similarly removing
deallocations.
Survival Enhancement: One potential benefit of even in-
correct patches is that they may enhance the survival of
the application even if they do not produce completely cor-
rect execution. This was the goal of several previous sys-
tems (which often produce correct execution even though
that was not the goal) [49, 9, 38, 10, 26, 32, 40, 17, 43].
Defect lighttpd-bug-1794-1795 terminates the program if it
encounters an unknown configuration file setting. The gen-
erated patches enhance survival by removing the check and
enabling lighttpd to boot even with such configuration files.
We note that removing the check is similar to the standard
practice of disabling assertions in production use.
Relatively Minor Defects: We note that some of the
defects can be viewed as relatively minor. For example,
python-bug-69223-69224 causes the unpatched version of
python to produce a SelectError message instead of a Val-
ueError message — i.e., the correct behavior is to pro-
duce an error message, the defect is that python pro-
duces the wrong error message. Three of the wireshark
defects (wireshark-bug-37172-37171, wireshark-bug-37172-
37173, wireshark-bug-37284-37285) were caused by a devel-
oper checking in a version of wireshark with a debug macro
flag set. The relevant defect is that these versions generate
debugging information to the screen and to a log file. The
correct behavior omits this debugging information.
7. ORIGINAL GENPROG PATCHES
We also analyzed the reported patches from the original
GenProg system [57, 20]. Out of the 11 defects evaluated in
the two papers, the corresponding patches for 9 defects are
plausible but incorrect. 9 of the 11 patches simply eliminate
functionality (by removing statements or adding a return or
exit statements). We next discuss the reported patch for
each application in turn.
• uniq: The patch is semantically equivalent to remov-
ing the statement *buf++ = c at uniq.c:74. The effect
is that the patched application will ignore the user in-
put file and operate as if the file were empty. Because
of the use of a weak proxy, this patch is not plausible.
The test scripts check the exit code of the program,
not whether the output is correct.
• look-u: The patch is semantically equivalent to re-
moving the condition argv[1] == "-" from the while
loop at look.c:63. The effect is that look will treat the
first command line argument (-d, -f, -t) as the name
of the input file. Unless a file with such a name exists,
look will then immediately exit without processing the
intended input file.
• look-s: The patch is semantically equivalent to re-
placing the statement mid = (top+bot)/2 at look.c:87
with exit(0). The effect is that look will always exit
immediately without printing any output (if the in-
put file exists, if not, look will print an error message
before it exits).
The patch is plausible because the use of a weak test
suite — the correct output for the positive and neg-
ative test cases is always no output. If the correct
output for any of the test cases had been non-empty,
this patch would have been implausible.
• units: The units program asks the user to input a se-
quence of pairs of units (for example, the pair meter
and feet) and prints out the conversion factor between
the two units in the pair. The patch is semantically
equivalent to adding init() after units.c:279. The un-
patched version of the program does not check for an
overflow of the user input buffer. A long user input
will therefore overflow the buffer.
The GenProg patch does not eliminate the buffer over-
flow. It instead clears the unit table whenever the
program reads an unrecognized unit (whether the unit
overflows the user input buffer or not). Any subse-
quent attempt to look up the conversion for any pair
of units will fail. It is also possible for the buffer over-
flow to crash the patched program.
• deroff: When deroff reads a backslash construct (for
example, \L), it should read the next character (for
example, ”) as a delimiter. It should then skip any text
until it reaches another occurrence of the delimiter or
the end of the line.
The patch is semantically equivalent to removing the
statement bdelim=c (automatically generated as part
of a macro expansion) at deroff.c:524. The effect is that
the patched program does not process the delimiter
correctly — when it encounters a delimiter, it skips all
of the remaining text on the line, including any text
after the next occurrence of the delimiter.
• nullhttpd: The patch is semantically equiva-
lent to removing the call to strcmp(..., "POST")
httpd comb.c:4092-4099. The effect is that all POST
requests generate an HTML bad request error reply.
• indent: The patch is semantically equivalent to
adding a return after indent.c:926. The GenProg 2009
paper states that ”Our repair removes handling of
C comments that are not C++ comments.” Our ex-
periments with the patched version indicate that the
patched version correctly handles at least some C com-
ments that are not C++ comments (we never observed
a C comment that it handled incorrectly). In many
cases, however, the patched version simply exits after
reading a { character, truncating the input file after
the {.
• flex: The patch is semantically equivalent to remov-
ing the call to strcpy() at flex comb.c:13784. This call
transfers the token (stored in yytext) into the variable
nmdef. Removing the call to strcpy() causes flex to
incorrectly operate with an uninitialied nmdef. This
variable holds one of the parsed tokens to process. The
effect is that flex fails to parse the input file and incor-
rectly produces error messages that indicate that flex
encountered an unrecognized rule.
• atris: The commments in the atris source code in-
dicate that it is graphical tetris game. atris has the
ability to load in user options stored in the .atrisrc
in the user’s home directory. A call to sprintf()
at atrix comb.c:5879 initializes the string buffer that
specifies the filename of this .atrisrc file. If the home
directory is longer than 2048 characters this sprintf()
call will overflow the buffer.
The patch is semantically equivalent to removing the
call to sprintf() at atrix comb.c:5879. The result is
that the program passes an uninitialized filename to
the procedure that reads the .atrisrc file.
The remaining 2 programs, for which GenProg generates
correct patches, are used as motivating examples in the ICSE
2009 and GECCO 2009 papers [57, 20]. These two programs
contain less than 30 lines of code.
We note that many of the test scripts use weak proxies.
Specifically, all uniq, look-u, and look-s test cases do not
compare the output of the patched program to the correct
output. They instead check only that the patched program
produces the correct exit code. Similarly, the deroff and
indent negative test case test scripts only check the exit code.
8. KALI
The basic idea behind Kali is to search a simple patch
space that consists solely of patches that remove function-
ality. There are two potential goals: 1) if the correct patch
simply removes functionality, find the patch, 2) if the cor-
rect patch does not simply remove functionality, generate a
patch that modifies the functionality containing the defect.
For an existing statement, Kali deploys the following kinds
of patches:
• Redirect Branch: If the existing statement is a
branch statement, set the condition to true or false.
The effect is that the then or else branch always exe-
cutes.
• Insert Return: Insert a return before the existing
statement. If the function returns a pointer, the in-
serted return statement returns NULL. If the function
returns an integer, Kali generates two patches: one
that returns 0 and another that returns -1.
• Remove Statement: Remove the existing state-
ment. If the statement is a compound statement, Kali
will remove all substatements inside it as well.
Statement Ordering: Each Kali patch targets a state-
ment. Kali uses instrumented executions to collect informa-
tion and order the executed statements as follows. Given a
statement s and a test case i, r(s, i) is the recorded execution
counter that identifies the last execution of the statement s
when the application runs with test case i. In particular, if
the statement s is not executed at all when the application
runs with the test case i, then r(s, i) = 0. Neg is the set
of negative test cases (for which the unpatched application
produces incorrect output) and Pos is the set of positive test
cases (for which the unpatched application produces correct
output). Kali computes three scores a(s), b(s), c(s) for each
statement s:
a(s) = | {i | r(s, i) 6= 0, i ∈ Neg} |
b(s) = | {i | r(s, i) = 0, i ∈ Pos} |
c(s) = Σi∈Negr(s, i)
A statement s1 has higher priority than a statement s2 if
prior(s1, s2) = 1, where prior is defined as:
prior(s1, s2) =

1 a(s1) > a(s2)
1 a(s1) = a(s2), b(s1) > b(s2)
1
a(s1) = a(s2), b(s1) = b(s2),
c(s1) > c(s2)
0 otherwise
Intuitively, Kali prioritizes statements 1) that are exe-
cuted with more negative test cases, 2) that are executed
with less positive test cases, and 3) that are executed later
during the executions with negative test cases. The Kali
search space includes the top 500 ranked statements regard-
less of the file in which they appear.
Search: Kali deterministically searches the patch space in
tiers: first all patches that change an if condition, then all
patches that insert a return, then all patches that remove a
statement. Within each tier, Kali applies the patch to the
statements in the priority order identified above. It accepts
a patch if the patch produces correct outputs for all of the
inputs in the validation test suite.
Defect GenProg RSRepair AE
Kali
Result Search Space Search Time Type
fbc-5458-5459 Plausible - Plausible‡ Plausible 737 2.4m SL†
gmp-14166-14167 Plausible Plausible‡ Plausible Plausible 1169 19.5m DP
gzip-3fe0ca-39a362 Plausible Plausible Plausible‡ Plausible 1241 28.2m SF (119)*
gzip-a1d3d4-f17cbd No Patch - Plausible No Patch
libtiff-0860361d-1ba75257 Plausible‡ Implausible Plausible‡ Plausible 1525 16.7m SL*
libtiff-5b02179-3dfb33b Plausible‡ Implausible Plausible‡ Plausible 1476 4.1m DP
libtiff-90d136e4-4c66680f Implausible Implausible Plausible‡ Plausible 1591 45.0m SL†
libtiff-d13be72c-ccadf48a Plausible‡ Plausible‡ Plausible‡ Plausible 1699 42.9m SL*
libtiff-ee2ce5b7-b5691a5a Implausible Implausible Plausible‡ Plausible 1590 45.1m SF(10)*
lighttpd-1794-1795 Plausible‡ - Plausible‡ Plausible 1569 5.9m
lighttpd-1806-1807 Plausible‡ Plausible‡ Plausible‡ Plausible 1530 55.5m SF(21)†
lighttpd-1913-1914 Plausible‡ Plausible‡ No Patch Plausible 1579 158.7m SL*
lighttpd-2330-2331 Plausible‡ Plausible‡ Plausible‡ Plausible 1640 36.8m SF(19)†
lighttpd-2661-2662 Plausible‡ Plausible‡ Plausible‡ Plausible 1692 59.7m DP
php-307931-307934 Plausible‡ - Plausible‡ Plausible 880 9.2m DP
php-308525-308529 No Patch - Plausible‡ Plausible 1152 234.0m SL†
php-309111-309159 No Patch - Correct No Patch
php-309892-309910 Correct‡ Correct‡ Correct‡ Correct 1498 20.2m C
php-309986-310009 Plausible‡ - Plausible‡ Plausible 1125 10.4m SF(27)*
php-310011-310050 Plausible - Plausible‡ Plausible 971 12.9m SL*
php-310370-310389 No Patch - No Patch Plausible 1096 12.0m DP
php-310673-310681 Plausible‡ - Plausible‡ Plausible 1295 89.00m SL*
php-311346-311348 No Patch - No Patch Correct 941 14.7m C
python-69223-69224 No Patch - Plausible No Patch
python-69783-69784 Correct‡ Correct‡ Correct‡ Correct 1435 16.1m C
python-70098-70101 No Patch - Plausible Plausible 1233 6.8m SL*
wireshark-37112-37111 Plausible‡ Plausible Plausible‡ Plausible 1412 19.6m SL†
wireshark-37172-37171 No Patch - Plausible‡ Plausible 1459 10.9m SL†
wireshark-37172-37173 No Patch - Plausible‡ Plausible 1459 10.9m SL†
wireshark-37284-37285 No Patch - Plausible‡ Plausible 1482 11.5m SL†
Figure 1: Experimental Results
8.1 Kali Evaluation Methodology
We evaluate Kali on all of the 105 defects in the GenProg
set of benchmark defects [3]. We also use the validation
test suites from this benchmark set. Our patch evaluation
infrastructure is derived from the GenProg patch evalua-
tion infrastructure [3]. For each defect, Kali runs its auto-
matic patch generation and search algorithm to generate a
sequence of candidate patches. For each candidate patch,
Kali applies the patch to the application, recompiles the ap-
plication, and uses the patch evaluation infrastructure to
run the patched application on the inputs in the patch vali-
dation test suite. To check if the patch corrects the known
incorrect behavior from the test suite, Kali first runs the
negative test cases. To check if the patch preserves known
correct behavior from the test suite, Kali next runs the pos-
itive test cases. If all of the test cases produce the correct
output, Kali accepts the patch. Otherwise it stops the eval-
uation of the candidate patch at the first incorrect test case
and moves on to evaluate the next patch.
Kali evaluates the php patches using the modified php
test harness described in Section 3. It evaluates the gmp
patches using a modified gmp test script that checks that
all output components are correct. It evaluates the libtiff
patches with augmented test scripts that compare various
elements of the libtiff output image files from the patched
executions with the corresponding elements from the correct
image files. Other components of the image files change
nondeterministically without affecting the correctness. The
libtiff test scripts therefore do not fully check for correct
outputs. After Kali obtains patches that pass the modified
libtiff test scripts, we manually evaluate the outputs to filter
all Kali patches that do not produce correct outputs for
all of the inputs in the validation test suite. This manual
evaluation rejects 7 libtiff patches, leaving only 5 plausible
patches. Effective image comparison software would enable
Kali to fully automate the libtiff patch evaluation.
We perform all of our Kali experiments (except for the
fbc defects) on Amazon EC2 Intel Xeon 2.6GHz Machines
running Ubuntu-64bit 14.04. The fbc application only runs
in 32-bit environment, so we use a virtual machine with Intel
Core 2.7GHz running Ubuntu-32bit 14.04 for fbc.
8.2 Experimental Results
Figure 1 presents the experimental results from our anal-
ysis of these patches. The figure contains a row for each
defect for which at least one system (GenProg, RSRepair,
AE, or Kali) generates a plausible patch. The second to fifth
columns present the results of GenProg, RSRepair, AE, and
Kali on each defect. “Correct” indicates that the system gen-
erates at least one correct patch for the defect. “Plausible”
indicates that the system generates at least one plausible
patch but no correct patches for the defect. “Implausible”
indicates that all patches generated by the system for the
defect are not plausible. “No Patch” indicates that the sys-
tem does not generate any patch for the defect. “-” indicates
that the RSRepair researchers chose not to include the de-
fect in their study [44]. “‡” indicates that at least one of
analyzed patches is not equivalent to a single functionality
elimination modification.
Our results show that for the defects in the GenProg
benchmark set, Kali generates correct patches for at least
as many defects (3 for Kali vs. 3 for AE and 2 for GenProg
and RSRepair) and plausible patches for at least as many
defects (27 for Kali vs. 18 for GenProg, 10 for RSRepair,
and 27 for AE).
Search Space and Time Results: The sixth column of
Figure 1 presents the size of the search space for each de-
fect (which is always less than 1700 patches). The seventh
column presents the search times. Kali typically finds the
patches in tens of minutes. If the search space does not
contain a plausible patch, Kali typically searches the entire
space in several hours and always less than seven hours.
It is not possible to directly compare the reported per-
formance numbers for GenProg, RSRepair, and AE [24, 44,
56] with the numbers in Figure 1. First, the reported aggre-
gate results for these prior systems include large numbers
of implausible patches. The reported results for individual
defects ([44], Table 2) report too few test case executions
to validate plausible patches for the validation test suite
(specifically, the reported number of test case executions is
less than the number of test cases in the test suite). Second,
these prior systems reduce the search space by requiring the
developer to identify a target source code file to attempt to
patch (Kali, of course, works with the entire application).
Nevertheless, the search space sizes for these prior systems
appear to be in the tens of thousands ([56], Table I) as op-
posed to hundreds for Kali. These numbers are consistent
with the simpler Kali search space induced by the simpler
set of Kali functionality deletion modifications.
Patch Classification: The last column of Figure 1 presents
our classification of the Kali patches. “C” indicates that the
Kali patch is correct. There are three defects for which Kali
generates a correct patch. For two of the defects (php-bug-
309111-309159, python-bug-69783-69784) both the Kali and
developer patch simply delete an if statement. For php-
bug-311346-311348, the Kali patch is a then redirect patch.
The developer patch changes the else branch, but when the
condition is true, the then branch and modified else branch
have the same semantics.
“SL” indicates that the Kali and corresponding devel-
oper patches modify the same line of code. “*” indicates
that the developer patch modified only the function that
the Kali patch modified. “†” indicates that the developer
patch modified other code outside the function. In many
cases the Kali patch cleanly identifies the exact functional-
ity and location that the developer patch modifies. Exam-
ples include changing the same if condition (fbc-bug-5458-
5459, libtiff-bug-d13be72c-ccadf48a), changing the condition
of an if statement when the developer patch modifies the
then and/or else clause of that same if statement (python-
bug-70098-70101, libtiff-bug-0860361d-1ba75257, wireshark-
bug-37112-37111), deleting code that the developer patch
encloses in an if statement (lighttpd-bug-1913-1914, php-
bug-310673-310681, and deleting the same code (php-bug-
308525-308529, libtiff-bug-0860361d-1ba75257, libtiff-bug-
90d136e4-4c66680f, wireshark-bug-37172-37171, wireshark-
bug-37172-37173, wireshark-bug-37284-37285) as the devel-
oper patch. Many of the patches correspond quite closely to
the developer patch and move the application in the same
direction.
“SF” indicates that the Kali and corresponding developer
patches modify the same function. The number in parenthe-
ses is the distance in lines of code between the Kali patch and
developer modifications. The Kali and developer patches
typically modify common functionality and variables. Ex-
amples include reference counting (php-bug-309986-310009),
caching (lighttpd-bug-1806-1807), and file encoding mecha-
nism functionality (lighttpd-bug-2330-2331).
“DP” indicates that the Kali and developer patches mod-
ify different functions, but there is some dependence that
connects the Kali and developer patches. Examples include
changing the return value of a function invoked by code that
the developer patch modifies (gmp-bug-14166-14167), delet-
ing a call to a function that the developer patch modifies
(php-bug-307931-307934), modifying memory management
code for the same data structure (php-bug-310370-310389),
and accessing the same value, with either the Kali or the de-
veloper patch changing the value (lighttpd-bug-2661-2662,
libtiff-bug-5b02179-3dfb33b).
The Kali patch for lighttpd-bug-1794-1795 (like the Gen-
Prog and AE patches) is an outlier — it deletes error han-
dling code automatically generated by the yacc parser gen-
erator. The developer patch changes the yacc code to handle
new configuration parameters. We do not see the any of the
automatically generated patches as providing useful infor-
mation about the defect.
python-bug-69783-69784: Figure 8 (see Appendix B)
presents the Kali patch for python-bug-69783-69784. Like
the GenProg, RSRepair, and AE patches, the patch for this
defect deletes the if statement that implements two-digit
years. Note that unlike these previous systems, which gen-
erate preprocessed code, Kali operates directly on and there-
fore preserves the structure of the original source code. To
implement the deletion, Kali conjoins false (i.e., !1) to the
condition of the if statement.
php-bug-309892-309910: Figure 9 (see Appendix B)
presents the Kali patch for php-bug-309892-309910. Like
the GenProg, RSRepair, and AE patches, this patch deletes
the if statement that implements the obsolete check.
php-bug-311346-311348: Figure 10 (see Appendix B)
presents the Kali patch for php-bug-311346-311348. This
code concatenates two strings, ctx->buf.c and output. The
original code incorrectly set the result handled_output to
NULL when the first string is empty. The Kali patch, in
effect, deletes the else branch of the if statement on line 1
so that handled_output is correctly set when ctx->buf.c is
empty and output is not empty. Figure 11 presents the de-
veloper patch. The developer patches the else branch to cor-
rectly set handled_output when ctx->buf.c is empty. The
two patches have the same semantics.
8.3 Discussion
While many of the plausible but incorrect Kali patches
precisely pinpoint the defective code, that is far from the
only useful aspect of the patch. The fact that the patch
changes the behavior of the program to produce the cor-
rect output for the negative input provides insight into what
functionality is defective and how the defect affects that
functionality. Even when the Kali patch is not correct, it
often moves the program in the same direction as the devel-
oper patch, for example by deleting code that the developer
patch causes to execute only conditionally.
We note that, by directly implementing functionality elim-
ination patches (as opposed to using a broader set of modi-
fications to generate more complex patches that, in the end,
are equivalent to functionality elimination), the Kali patches
can be more transparent and easier to understand. Many
GenProg patches, for example, contain multiple modifica-
tions that can obscure the semantic simplicity of the patch.
Unlike GenProg, RSRepair, and AE, Kali operates directly
on the original source code. The prior systems, in contrast,
operate on preprocessed code, which in our experience sig-
nificantly impairs the transparency and comprehensibility of
the patches.
9. CLEARVIEW
Of course GenProg, RSRepair, and AE (and now Kali)
are not the only generate-and-validate patch generation sys-
tems. ClearView is a generate-and-validate system that ob-
serves normal executions to learn invariants that charac-
terize safe behavior [43]. It deploys monitors that detect
crashes, illegal control transfers and out of bounds write de-
fects. In response, it selects a nearby invariant that the input
that triggered the defect violates, and generates patches that
take a repair action when the invariant is violated. Subse-
quent executions enable ClearView to determine if 1) the
patch eliminates the defect while 2) preserving desired be-
nign behavior. ClearView, GenProg, RSRepair, AE, and
Kali all use the basic generate-and-validate approach of gen-
erating multiple patches, then evaluating the patches based
on their impact on subsequent executions of the patched
application. But ClearView leverages additional informa-
tion not immediately available in the test suite, specifically
invariants learned in previous executions on benign inputs.
This additional information enables ClearView to produce
more targeted patches. The experimental results indicate
that this additional information enables ClearView to pro-
duce more successful patches in less time (ClearView pro-
duces patches in five minutes on average for the evaluated
defects [43]).
ClearView differs from GenProg, RSRepair, and AE in
two important ways. First, ClearView’s goal is to enable
the program to survive defect-triggering inputs and secu-
rity attacks and to continue on to process subsequent inputs
successfully. Therefore the correct outputs for the inputs
that trigger the defects are not required and not available.
In some cases it is not even clear what the correct output
should be. More generally, how one would obtain correct
outputs for defect-triggering inputs is an open question —
in many cases we anticipate that the easiest way of obtaining
such outputs may be to manually fix the defect, then use the
new version of the program to produce the correct output.
For such cases, the utility of automatic patch generation sys-
tems that require correct outputs for defect-triggering inputs
is not clear. The difficulty is especially acute for fully au-
tomatic systems that must respond to new defect-triggering
inputs with no human intervention and no good way to ob-
tain correct outputs for these inputs.
A second difference is that ClearView generates binary
patches and applies these binary patches to running pro-
grams without otherwise interrupting the execution of the
program. It is, of course, possible to automatically generate
source-level patches, but binary patching gives ClearView
much more flexibility in that it can patch programs without
source and without terminating the application, recompil-
ing, and restarting.
ClearView Patch Evaluation: ClearView was evaluated
by a hostile Red Team attempting to exploit security vul-
nerabilities in Firefox [43]. The Red Team developed attack
web pages that targeted 10 Firefox vulnerabilities. These
attack web pages were used during a Red Team exercise to
evaluate the ability of ClearView to automatically generate
patches that eliminated the vulnerability. During the Red
Team exercise, ClearView automatically generated patches
for 7 of the 10 defects. Additional experiments performed
after the Red Team exercise showed that a ClearView con-
figuration change enables ClearView to automatically patch
one of the remaining vulnerabilities and that an enhanced
set of learning inputs enables ClearView to automatically
patch another of the remaining vulnerabilities, for a total of
9 ClearView patches for 10 vulnerabilities. An examination
of the patches after the Red Team exercise indicates that
each patch successfully eliminated the corresponding secu-
rity vulnerability. A manual translation of these ClearView
patches into source-level patches is available [47].
To evaluate the quality of the continued execution after
the presentation of the attack, the Red Team also devel-
oped 57 previously unseen benign web pages that exercised
a range of Firefox functionality. ClearView learned invari-
ants not from these 57 web pages but from other benign web
pages developed independently of the Red Team. All of the
9 generated patches enabled Firefox to survive the security
attacks and continue successful execution to produce correct
behavior on these 57 benign web pages.
Correctness and Functionality Elimination: Unlike
(apparently) the GenProg, RSRepair, and AE patches, the
ClearView patches were subjected to intensive human in-
vestigation and evaluation during the Red Team evaluation.
The ability of the generated patches to eliminate security
vulnerabilities is therefore well understood. Although gen-
erating correct patches was not a goal, our evaluation of the
patches indicates that at least 4 of the patches are correct
(for defects 285595, 290162, 295854, and 296134). 3 of the
patches implement conditional functionality elimination —
they insert an if statement that checks a condition and re-
turns if the condition is true. 5 of the patches implement a
conditional assignment — they insert an if statement that
checks a condition and, if the condition is true, sets a vari-
able to a value that enforces a learned invariant.
10. THREATS TO VALIDITY
The data set considered in this paper was selected not
by us, but by the GenProg developers in an attempt to
obtain a large, unbiased, and realistic benchmark set [24].
The authors represent the study based on this data set as a
“Systematic Study of Automated Program Repair”and iden-
tify one of the three main contributions of the paper as a
“systematic evaluation” that “includes two orders of magni-
tude more”source code, test cases, and defects than previous
studies [24]. Moreover, the benchmark set was specifically
constructed to “help address generalizability concerns” [24].
Nevertheless, one potential threat to validity is that our re-
sults may not generalize to other applications, defects, and
test suites. In particular, if the test suites provide more cov-
erage of the functionality that contains the defect, we would
not expect functionality deletion modifications to be as ef-
fective in enabling applications to produce plausible patches.
For each defect, we analyze only the first five patches
that RSRepair generates. It is possible that the remain-
ing patches may have other characteristics (although our
initial examination of these other patches revealed no new
characteristics).
11. RELATEDWORK
SPR: SPR is a generate-and-validate patch generation sys-
tem [30, 31] that uses staged condition synthesis. SPR first
selects parameterized patch schemas, some of which contain
abstract values to represent branch conditions. For each
schema, SPR determines whether there is any instantiation
of the schema that can pass all test cases. If so, SPR then
instantiates the abstract value in the schema to obtain and
validate candidate patches. For schemas with abstract con-
ditions, SPR finds a set of desired branch directions for that
abstract condition and synthesizes an expression that real-
izes these branch directions. This technique significantly re-
duces the number of candidate patches that SPR attempts to
validate. For the same GenProg benchmark set [24] (exclud-
ing the 36 deliberate functionality changes), the SPR search
space contains correct patches for 19 defects, 11 of which
SPR finds as the first patch that passes the test suite. SPR
also finds the correct patch for python-bug-69783-69784.
Prophet: Prophet is a patch generation system that learns
a probabilistic model over candidate patches from a large
code database that contains many past successful human
patches [29]. It defines the probabilistic model as the com-
bination of a distribution over program points based on an
error localization algorithm and a parameterized log-linear
distribution over program modification operations. It then
learns the model parameters via maximum log-likelihood,
which identifies important characteristics of successful hu-
man patches. Prophet uses the learned model to identify
likely correct patches within the Prophet search space. One
goal is to overcome the limitations of weak test suites by
learning characteristics of correct patches. For the same
GenProg benchmark set [24] (excluding the 36 deliberate
functionality changes), Prophet finds 14 correct patches as
the first patch that passes the test suite.
Multi-Application Code Transfer: CodePhage [52, 51]
automatically locates and transfers correct code from donor
applications to eliminate defects in recipient applications.
CodePhage successfully repaired 10 defects in 7 recipient
applications via code transfer from 5 donor applications.
Failure-Oblivous Computing: Failure-oblivious comput-
ing [49] checks for out of bounds reads and writes. It dis-
cards out of bounds writes and manufactures values for out
of bounds reads. This eliminates data corruption from out
of bounds writes, eliminates crashes from out of bounds ac-
cesses, and enables the program to continue execution along
its normal execution path.
Failure-oblivious computing was evaluated on 5 errors in 5
server applications. For all 5 errors, this technique enabled
the servers to survive otherwise fatal errors and continue on
to successfully process subsequent inputs. For 2 of the 5
errors, it completely eliminates the error and, on all inputs,
deliver the same output as the developer patch that corrects
the error (we believe these patches are correct).
Boundless Memory Blocks: Boundless memory blocks
store out of bounds writes in a hash table to return as
the result of corresponding out of bounds reads [48]. The
technique was evaluated on the same set of applications as
failure-oblivious computing and delivered the same results.
Bolt and Jolt: Bolt [26] attaches to a running applica-
tion, determines if the application is in an infinite loop, and,
if so, exits the loop. A user can also use Bolt to exit a
long-running loop. In both cases the goal is to enable the
application to continue useful execution. Bolt was evaluated
on 13 infinite and 2 long-running loops in 12 applications.
For 14 of the 15 loops Bolt delivered a result that was the
same or better than terminating the application. For 7 of
the 15 loops, Bolt completely eliminates the error and, on
all inputs, delivers the same output as the developer patch
that corrects the error (we believe these patches are cor-
rect). Jolt applies a similar approach but uses the compiler
to insert the instrumentation [10].
RCV: RCV [32] enables applications to survive null deref-
erence and divide by zero errors. It discards writes via null
references, returns zero for reads via null references, and re-
turns zero as the result of divides by zero. Execution then
continues along the normal execution path.
RCV was evaluated on 18 errors in 7 applications. For
17 of these 18 errors, RCV enables the application to sur-
vive the error and continue on to successfully process the
remaining input. For 11 of the 18 errors, RCV completely
eliminates the error and, on all inputs, delivers either iden-
tical (9 of 11 errors) or equivalent (2 of 11 errors) outputs as
the developer patch that corrects the error (we believe these
patches are correct).
Memory Leaks: Cyclic memory allocation eliminates
memory leaks by statically bounding the amount of memory
that can be allocated at any allocation site [40]. LeakFix [23]
proposes to fix memory leaks in C programs by inserting
deallocations automatically. LeakFix guarantees that the
inserted fix is safe, i.e., the inserted fix will not cause free-
before-allocation, double-free, or use-after-free errors.
Integer and Buffer Overflows: TAP automatically dis-
covers and patches integer and buffer overflow errors [53].
TAP uses a template-based approach to generate source-
level patches that test for integer or buffer overflows. If an
overflow is detected, the patches exit the program before the
overflow can occur.
Data Structure Repair: Data structure repair enables
applications to recover from data structure corruption er-
rors [14, 16, 15, 13]. Data structure repair enforces a data
structure consistency specification. This specification can
be provided by a human developer or automatically inferred
from correct program executions [13]. Assertion-based data
structure repair [18] starts from an erroneous data structure
state that triggers an assertion violation and uses symbolic
execution to explore possible structure mutations that can
repair the state.
APPEND: APPEND [17] proposes to eliminate null
pointer exceptions in Java by applying recovery techniques
such as replacing the null pointer with a pointer to an ini-
tialized instance of the appropriate class. The presented
examples illustrate how this technique can effectively elimi-
nate null pointer exceptions and enhance program survival.
Principled PHP Repair: PHPQuickFix and PHPRepair
use string constraint-solving techniques to automatically re-
pair php programs that generate HTML [50]. By formulat-
ing the problem as a string constraint problem, PHPRepair
obtains sound, complete, and minimal repairs to ensure the
patched php program passes a validation test suite. PH-
PRepair therefore illustrates how the structure in the prob-
lem enables a principled solution that provides benefits that
other program repair systems typically cannot provide.
Solver-Based Approaches: Several patch generation sys-
tems use SMT solvers to search the patch space. SemFix
uses SMT solvers to find expressions that enable the patched
program to generate correct outputs for all inputs in a vali-
dation test suite [39]. DirectFix extends SemFix to limit the
search space to small patches [36]. NOPOL uses a solver to
repair incorrect branch conditions [12]. The goal is to find a
new branch condition that flips the taken branch direction
for negative test cases and preserves the taken branch direc-
tion for positive test cases [12]. Infinitel uses a solver to find
new loop exit conditions that eliminate infinite loops [33].
Debroy and Wong: Debroy and Wong present a
generate-and-validate approach with two modifications: re-
placement of an operator with another from the same class
and condition negation [11]. The results, on the Siemens
suite (which contains seeded errors) and the Java Ant pro-
gram, indicate that this approach can effectively fix a rea-
sonable percentage of the studied errors. Our research dif-
fers in the scale of the benchmark programs (large produc-
tion programs rather than, in the case of the Seimens suite,
small benchmark programs), the nature of the faults (natu-
rally occurring rather than seeded), and the identification of
deletion as an effective way of obtaining plausible patches.
Mutation-Based Fault Localization: The Metallaxis-
FL system operates on the principle that mutants that ex-
hibit similar test suite behavior (i.e., fail and pass the same
test cases) as the original program containing the defect are
likely to modify statements near the defect [41, 42]. This
principle is opposite to the Kali approach (Kali searches
for modifications that pass all test cases even though the
original program fails at least one). The results show that
Metallaxis-FL works best with test suites with good cover-
age of the code with the defect. The production test suites
with which we evaluate Kali, in contrast, have poor coverage
of the code with the defect (which we would expect to typi-
cally be the case in practice). Metallaxis-FL was evaluated
on the Siemens suite (with hundreds of lines of code per pro-
gram). Kali, in contrast, was evaluated on large production
applications.
Researchers have used automated program repair to mea-
sure the effectiveness of fault localization techniques (us-
ing the different techniques to drive patch generation loca-
tions) [45]. Kali, in contrast, uses automated program repair
to, in part, generate patches that provide useful information
about defects.
Human Patch Acceptability: A study comparing the ac-
ceptability of GenProg, PAR, and human-generated patches
for Java programs found that the PAR patches were more ac-
ceptable to human developers than the GenProg patches [25]
(GenProg works on C programs. It is not clear how the au-
thors of the PAR paper managed to get GenProg to generate
patches for Java programs). The study only addresses hu-
man acceptability, with apparently no investigation of patch
correctness. The study also found that PAR generated plau-
sible patches for more defects than GenProg. The study
noted that GenProg produced plausible patches for only 13%
(16 out of 119) of the defects in the study as opposed to the
52% (55 out of 105) reported in the GenProg paper [24]. One
potential explanation for this discrepancy is the use of weak
proxies in the GenProg paper, which substantially increases
the number of reported patches.
Patch Characteristics: Researchers have investigated the
relative frequencies of different patch generation modifica-
tions, both for automated patch generation [28] and for
patches generated by human developers (but with applica-
tions to automatic patch generation) [35]. Both of these
papers characterize the syntactic modifications (add, substi-
tute, delete) used to create the patch. Our semantic patch
analysis, in contrast, works with the patch semantics to rec-
ognize the semantic equivalence of different syntactic modi-
fications — the vast majority of the patches that we analyze
are semantically equivalent to a single functionality deletion
modification (even though the patch itself may be imple-
mented with a variety of different syntactic modifications).
Fix Ingredients: Martinez et. al. studied more than 7,000
human commits in six open source programs to measure
the fix ingredient availability, i.e., the percentage of com-
mits that could be synthesized solely from existing lines of
code. The results show that only 3-17% of the commits
can be synthesized from existing lines of code. The study
provides another potential explanation for the inability of
GenProg, RSRepair, and AE to generate correct patches —
the GenProg, RSRepair and AE search space only contains
patches that can be synthesized from existing lines of code
(specifically by copying and/or removing existing statements
without variable replacement or any other expression-level
modification).
Discussion: A common pattern that emerges is that more
structure enhances the ability of the system to produce ef-
fective repairs (but also limits the scope of the defects that
it can handle). The availability of specifications can enable
systems to provide repairs with guaranteed correctness prop-
erties, but impose the (in many cases unrealistic) burden of
obtaining specifications. PHPRepair exploits the structure
present in the domain to provide principled patches for a
specific class of defects. Kali, GenProg, RSRepair, and AE
aspire to address a different and less structured class of de-
fects, but without the guarantees that PHPRepair can de-
liver. One of the benefits of exploiting the structure is a
reduced risk of producing patches with negative effects such
as the introduction of security vulnerabilities.
A primary goal of many of the targeted systems is to en-
able applications to survive otherwise fatal inputs [49, 9, 38,
10, 26, 32, 40, 14, 43]. The rationale is that the applica-
tions (conceptually) process multiple inputs; enabling appli-
cations to survive otherwise fatal inputs enables the appli-
cations to successfully process subsequent inputs. The tech-
niques therefore focus on eliminating fatal errors or security
vulnerabilities in potentially adversarial use cases. Gener-
ating correct output for such adversarial inputs is often not
a goal; in some cases it is not even clear what the correct
output should be. Nevertheless, the techniques often suc-
ceed in delivering patches with identical functionality as the
subsequent developer patches. They are also quite simple
— each repair typically consists of a check (such as an out
of bounds access) followed by a simple action (such as dis-
carding the write). Although GenProg, RSRepair, and AE
may, in principle, be able to generate larger and more com-
plex repairs, in practice the overwhelming majority of the
repairs that they do generate are semantically very simple.
12. CONCLUSION
The results presented in this paper highlight several
important design considerations for generate-and-validate
patch generation systems. First, such systems should not
use weak proxies (such as the exit code of the program) —
they should instead actually check that the patched program
produces acceptable output. Second, the search space and
search algorithm are critical — a successful system should
use 1) a search space that contains successful patches and
2) a search algorithm that can search the space efficiently
enough to find successful patches in an acceptable amount
of time. Third, simply producing correct results on a val-
idation test suite is (at least with current test suites) far
from enough to ensure acceptable patches. Especially when
the test suite does not contain test cases that protect de-
sired functionality, unsuccessful patches can easily generate
correct outputs.
Incorporating additional sources of information may be
a particularly effective way of improving patch quality.
Promising sources include correct code transferred from
other applications [52, 51], learning characteristics of suc-
cessful human-generated patches [29], learning character-
istics of previous successful executions [13, 43], exploiting
properties of targeted defect classes [49, 9, 38, 32, 17, 32,
40, 23, 10, 26, 33, 53], and specifications that identify cor-
rect program behavior [54, 14, 22].
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Westley Weimer for the very useful
and enlightening feedback he provided on various parts of
an earlier draft of this paper. We also thank the anonymous
reviewers for their insightful comments. This research was
supported by DARPA (Grant FA8650-11-C-7192).
13. REFERENCES
[1] AE results. http://dijkstra.cs.virginia.edu/
genprog/resources/genprog-ase2013-results.zip.
[2] CVE-2006-2025. http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/
cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2006-2025.
[3] GenProg benchmarks.
http://dijkstra.cs.virginia.edu/genprog/
resources/genprog-icse2012-benchmarks/.
[4] GenProg: Evolutionary Program Repair.
http://dijkstra.cs.virginia.edu/genprog/.
[5] GenProg results. http://dijkstra.cs.virginia.edu/
genprog/resources/genprog-icse2012-results.zip.
[6] GenProg source code.
http://dijkstra.cs.virginia.edu/genprog/
resources/genprog-source-v3.0.zip.
[7] GenProg virtual machine. http://dijkstra.cs.
virginia.edu/genprog/resources/genprog_images.
[8] RSRepair results. http:
//sourceforge.net/projects/rsrepair/files/.
[9] E. D. Berger and B. G. Zorn. Diehard: probabilistic
memory safety for unsafe languages. In ACM
SIGPLAN Notices, volume 41, pages 158–168. ACM,
2006.
[10] M. Carbin, S. Misailovic, M. Kling, and M. C. Rinard.
Detecting and escaping infinite loops with jolt. In
ECOOP 2011–Object-Oriented Programming, pages
609–633. Springer, 2011.
[11] V. Debroy and W. E. Wong. Using mutation to
automatically suggest fixes for faulty programs. In
Software Testing, Verification and Validation (ICST),
2010 Third International Conference on, pages 65–74.
IEEE, 2010.
[12] F. DeMarco, J. Xuan, D. Le Berre, and M. Monperrus.
Automatic repair of buggy if conditions and missing
preconditions with smt. In Proceedings of the 6th
International Workshop on Constraints in Software
Testing, Verification, and Analysis, CSTVA 2014,
pages 30–39, New York, NY, USA, 2014. ACM.
[13] B. Demsky, M. D. Ernst, P. J. Guo, S. McCamant,
J. H. Perkins, and M. C. Rinard. Inference and
enforcement of data structure consistency
specifications. In Proceedings of the ACM/SIGSOFT
International Symposium on Software Testing and
Analysis, ISSTA 2006, Portland, Maine, USA, July
17-20, 2006, pages 233–244, 2006.
[14] B. Demsky and M. Rinard. Automatic detection and
repair of errors in data structures. In Proceedings of
the 18th Annual ACM SIGPLAN Conference on
Object-oriented Programing, Systems, Languages, and
Applications, OOPSLA ’03’, pages 78–95, New York,
NY, USA, 2003. ACM.
[15] B. Demsky and M. Rinard. Data structure repair
using goal-directed reasoning. In Proceedings of the
27th International Conference on Software
Engineering, ICSE ’05’, pages 176–185, New York,
NY, USA, 2005. ACM.
[16] B. Demsky and M. C. Rinard. Static specification
analysis for termination of specification-based data
structure repair. In 14th International Symposium on
Software Reliability Engineering (ISSRE) 2003), 17-20
November 2003, Denver, CO, USA, pages 71–84, 2003.
[17] K. Dobolyi and W. Weimer. Changing java’s
semantics for handling null pointer exceptions. In 19th
International Symposium on Software Reliability
Engineering (ISSRE 2008), 11-14 November 2008,
Seattle/Redmond, WA, USA, pages 47–56, 2008.
[18] B. Elkarablieh, I. Garcia, Y. L. Suen, and S. Khurshid.
Assertion-based repair of complex data structures. In
Proceedings of the Twenty-second IEEE/ACM
International Conference on Automated Software
Engineering, ASE ’07’, pages 64–73, 2007.
[19] E. Fast, C. L. Goues, S. Forrest, and W. Weimer.
Designing better fitness functions for automated
program repair. In Genetic and Evolutionary
Computation Conference, GECCO 2010, Proceedings,
Portland, Oregon, USA, July 7-11, 2010, pages
965–972, 2010.
[20] S. Forrest, T. Nguyen, W. Weimer, and C. Le Goues.
A genetic programming approach to automated
software repair. In Proceedings of the 11th Annual
Conference on Genetic and Evolutionary
Computation, GECCO ’09’, pages 947–954, New York,
NY, USA, 2009. ACM.
[21] Z. P. Fry, B. Landau, and W. Weimer. A human study
of patch maintainability. In Proceedings of the 2012
International Symposium on Software Testing and
Analysis, pages 177–187. ACM, 2012.
[22] J. Galenson, P. Reames, R. Bod´ık, B. Hartmann, and
K. Sen. Codehint: dynamic and interactive synthesis
of code snippets. In 36th International Conference on
Software Engineering, ICSE ’14, Hyderabad, India -
May 31 - June 07, 2014, pages 653–663, 2014.
[23] Q. Gao, Y. Xiong, Y. Mi, L. Zhang, W. Yang, Z. Zhou,
B. Xie, and H. Mei. Safe memory-leak fixing for c
programs. In Proceedings of the 37th International
Conference on Software Engineering, 2015.
[24] C. L. Goues, M. Dewey-Vogt, S. Forrest, and
W. Weimer. A systematic study of automated
program repair: Fixing 55 out of 105 bugs for $8 each.
In 34th International Conference on Software
Engineering, ICSE 2012, June 2-9, 2012, Zurich,
Switzerland, pages 3–13, 2012.
[25] D. Kim, J. Nam, J. Song, and S. Kim. Automatic
patch generation learned from human-written patches.
In Proceedings of the 2013 International Conference
on Software Engineering, pages 802–811. IEEE Press,
2013.
[26] M. Kling, S. Misailovic, M. Carbin, and M. Rinard.
Bolt: on-demand infinite loop escape in unmodified
binaries. In ACM SIGPLAN Notices, volume 47, pages
431–450. ACM, 2012.
[27] C. Le Goues, T. Nguyen, S. Forrest, and W. Weimer.
Genprog: A generic method for automatic software
repair. Software Engineering, IEEE Transactions on,
38(1):54–72, 2012.
[28] C. Le Goues, W. Weimer, and S. Forrest.
Representations and operators for improving
evolutionary software repair. In Proceedings of the
fourteenth international conference on Genetic and
evolutionary computation conference, pages 959–966.
ACM, 2012.
[29] F. Long and M. Rinard. Prophet: Automatic patch
generation via learning from successful human patches.
Technical Report MIT-CSAIL-TR-2015-019, 2015.
[30] F. Long and M. Rinard. Staged program repair in
SPR. Technical Report MIT-CSAIL-TR-2015-008,
2015.
[31] F. Long and M. Rinard. Staged program repair in
SPR. In Proceedings of ESEC/FSE 2015 (to appear),
2015.
[32] F. Long, S. Sidiroglou-Douskos, and M. Rinard.
Automatic runtime error repair and containment via
recovery shepherding. In Proceedings of the 35th ACM
SIGPLAN Conference on Programming Language
Design and Implementation, page 26. ACM, 2014.
[33] S. L. Marcote and M. Monperrus. Automatic Repair
of Infinite Loops. Technical Report 1504.05078, Arxiv,
2015.
[34] M. Martinez. Extraction and analysis of knowledge for
automatic software repair. Software Engineering.
Universite Lille, (tel-01078911), 2014.
[35] M. Martinez and M. Monperrus. Mining software
repair models for reasoning on the search space of
automated program fixing. Empirical Software
Engineering, pages 1–30, 2013.
[36] S. Mechtaev, J. Yi, and A. Roychoudhury. Directfix:
Looking for simple program repairs. In Proceedings of
the 37th International Conference on Software
Engineering, 2015.
[37] M. Monperrus. A critical review of ”automatic patch
generation learned from human-written patches”:
essay on the problem statement and the evaluation of
automatic software repair. In 36th International
Conference on Software Engineering, ICSE ’14,
Hyderabad, India - May 31 - June 07, 2014, pages
234–242, 2014.
[38] V. Nagarajan, D. Jeffrey, and R. Gupta. Self-recovery
in server programs. In Proceedings of the 2009
international symposium on Memory management,
pages 49–58. ACM, 2009.
[39] H. D. T. Nguyen, D. Qi, A. Roychoudhury, and
S. Chandra. Semfix: Program repair via semantic
analysis. In Proceedings of the 2013 International
Conference on Software Engineering, ICSE ’13’, pages
772–781, Piscataway, NJ, USA, 2013. IEEE Press.
[40] H. H. Nguyen and M. Rinard. Detecting and
eliminating memory leaks using cyclic memory
allocation. In Proceedings of the 6th International
Symposium on Memory Management, ISMM ’07,
pages 15–30, New York, NY, USA, 2007. ACM.
[41] M. Papadakis and Y. Le Traon. Metallaxis-fl:
mutation-based fault localization. Software Testing,
Verification and Reliability, 2013.
[42] M. Papadakis and Y. Le Traon. Effective fault
localization via mutation analysis: A selective
mutation approach. In ACM Symposium On Applied
Computing (SAC’14), 2014.
[43] J. H. Perkins, S. Kim, S. Larsen, S. Amarasinghe,
J. Bachrach, M. Carbin, C. Pacheco, F. Sherwood,
S. Sidiroglou, G. Sullivan, et al. Automatically
patching errors in deployed software. In Proceedings of
the ACM SIGOPS 22nd symposium on Operating
systems principles, pages 87–102. ACM, 2009.
[44] Y. Qi, X. Mao, Y. Lei, Z. Dai, and C. Wang. The
strength of random search on automated program
repair. In ICSE, pages 254–265, 2014.
[45] Y. Qi, X. Mao, Y. Lei, and C. Wang. Using automated
program repair for evaluating the effectiveness of fault
localization techniques. In International Symposium
on Software Testing and Analysis, ISSTA ’13, Lugano,
Switzerland, July 15-20, 2013, 2013.
[46] Z. Qi, F. Long, S. Achour, and M. Rinard. An
Analysis of Patch Plausibility and Correctness for
Generate-And-Validate Patch Generation Systems
(Supplementary Material).
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/97051.
[47] Z. Qi, F. Long, S. Achour, and M. Rinard. An
Analysis of Patch Plausibility and Correctness for
Generate-And-Validate Patch Generation Systems
(Supplementary Material).
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/93255.
[48] M. C. Rinard, C. Cadar, D. Dumitran, D. M. Roy,
and T. Leu. A dynamic technique for eliminating
buffer overflow vulnerabilities (and other memory
errors). In ACSAC, pages 82–90, 2004.
[49] M. C. Rinard, C. Cadar, D. Dumitran, D. M. Roy,
T. Leu, and W. S. Beebee. Enhancing server
availability and security through failure-oblivious
computing. In OSDI, volume 4, pages 21–21, 2004.
[50] H. Samimi, M. Scha¨fer, S. Artzi, T. D. Millstein,
F. Tip, and L. J. Hendren. Automated repair of
HTML generation errors in PHP applications using
string constraint solving. In 34th International
Conference on Software Engineering, ICSE 2012, June
2-9, 2012, Zurich, Switzerland, pages 277–287, 2012.
[51] S. Sidiroglou, E. Lahtinen, F. Long, and M. Rinard.
Automatic error elimination by multi-application code
transfer. Technical Report MIT-CSAIL-TR-2014-024,
Aug. 2014.
[52] S. Sidiroglou, E. Lahtinen, F. Long, and M. Rinard.
Automatic error elimination by multi-application code
transfer. In Proceedings of the 36th ACM SIGPLAN
Conference on Programming Language Design and
Implementation. ACM, 2015.
[53] S. Sidiroglou-Douskos, E. Lahtinen, and M. Rinard.
Automatic discovery and patching of buffer and
integer overflow errors. Technical Report
MIT-CSAIL-TR-2015-018, 2015.
[54] Y. Wei, Y. Pei, C. A. Furia, L. S. Silva, S. Buchholz,
B. Meyer, and A. Zeller. Automated fixing of
programs with contracts. In Proceedings of the 19th
international symposium on Software testing and
analysis, pages 61–72. ACM, 2010.
[55] W. Weimer. Patches as better bug reports. In
Generative Programming and Component Engineering,
5th International Conference, GPCE 2006, Portland,
Oregon, USA, October 22-26, 2006, Proceedings, pages
181–190, 2006.
[56] W. Weimer, Z. P. Fry, and S. Forrest. Leveraging
program equivalence for adaptive program repair:
Models and first results. In Automated Software
Engineering (ASE), 2013 IEEE/ACM 28th
International Conference on, pages 356–366. IEEE,
2013.
[57] W. Weimer, T. Nguyen, C. Le Goues, and S. Forrest.
Automatically finding patches using genetic
programming. In Proceedings of the 31st International
Conference on Software Engineering, pages 364–374.
IEEE Computer Society, 2009.
APPENDIX
A. GENPROG AND AE CORRECT PATCHES
1 - if (y < 1000) {
2 - tmp___0 = PyDict_GetItemString(moddict, "accept2dyear");
3 - accept = tmp___0;
4 - if ((unsigned int )accept != (unsigned int )((void *)0)) {
5 - tmp___1 = PyObject_IsTrue(accept);
6 - acceptval = tmp___1;
7 - if (acceptval == -1) {
8 - return (0);
9 - } else {
10
11 - }
12
13 - if (acceptval) {
14 - if (0 <= y) {
15 - if (y < 69) {
16 - y += 2000;
17 - } else {
18 - goto _L;
19 - }
20 - } else {
21 - _L: /* CIL Label */
22 - if (69 <= y) {
23 - if (y < 100) {
24 - y += 1900;
25 - } else {
26 - PyErr_SetString(PyExc_ValueError,
27 "year out of range");
28 - return (0);
29 - }
30 - } else {
31 - PyErr_SetString(PyExc_ValueError,
32 "year out of range");
33 - return (0);
34 - }
35 - }
36
37 - tmp___2 = PyErr_WarnEx(PyExc_DeprecationWarning,
38 - "Century info guessed for a 2-digit year.", 1);
39 - if (tmp___2 != 0) {
40 - return (0);
41 - } else {
42
43 - }
44 - } else {
45
46 - }
47 - } else {
48 - return (0);
49 - }
50 - } else {
51
52 - }
53 p->tm_year = y - 1900;
54 (p->tm_mon) --;
55 p->tm_wday = (p->tm_wday + 1) % 7;
Figure 2: GenProg patch for python-bug-69783-69784
1 -if (y < 1000) {
2 - PyObject *accept = PyDict_GetItemString(moddict,
3 - "accept2dyear");
4 - if (accept != NULL) {
5 - int acceptval = PyObject_IsTrue(accept);
6 - if (acceptval == -1)
7 - return 0;
8 - if (acceptval) {
9 - if (0 <= y && y < 69)
10 - y += 2000;
11 - else if (69 <= y && y < 100)
12 - y += 1900;
13 - else {
14 - PyErr_SetString(PyExc_ValueError,
15 - "year out of range");
16 - return 0;
17 - }
18 - if (PyErr_WarnEx(PyExc_DeprecationWarning,
19 - "Century info guessed for a 2-digit year.", 1) != 0)
20 - return 0;
21 - }
22 - }
23 - else
24 - return 0;
25 -}
26 p->tm_year = y - 1900;
27 p->tm_mon--;
28 p->tm_wday = (p->tm_wday + 1) % 7;
Figure 3: Developer patch for python-bug-69783-69784
1 if (offset >= (long )s1_len) {
2 php_error_docref0((char const *)((void *)0), 1 << 1L,
3 "The start position cannot exceed initial string length");
4 while (1) {
5 __z___1 = return_value;
6 __z___1->value.lval = 0L;
7 __z___1->type = (unsigned char)3;
8 break;
9 }
10 return;
11 } else {
12
13 }
14 - if (len > (long )s1_len - offset) {
15 - len = (long )s1_len - offset;
16 - } else {
17
18 - }
19 if (len) {
20 tmp___1 = len;
21 } else {
22 if ((long )s2_len > (long )s1_len - offset) {
23 tmp___0 = (long )s2_len;
24 } else {
25 tmp___0 = (long )s1_len - offset;
26 }
27 tmp___1 = tmp___0;
28 }
29 cmp_len = (unsigned int )tmp___1;
Figure 4: GenProg patch for php-bug-309892-309910
1 if (offset >= s1_len) {
2 php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING,
3 "The start position cannot exceed initial string length");
4 RETURN_FALSE;
5 }
6
7 -if (len > s1_len - offset) {
8 - len = s1_len - offset;
9 -}
10
11 cmp_len = (uint) (len ? len : MAX(s2_len, (s1_len - offset)));
Figure 5: Developer patch for php-bug-309892-309910
1 if (pp) {
2 if ((unsigned int )pp < (unsigned int )p) {
3 + ...
4 p = pp;
5 + ...
6 + if (__genprog_mutant == 25) {
7 + if (p - s) {
8 + tmp___24 = _estrndup(s, (unsigned int )(p - s));
9 + ret->path = (char *)tmp___24;
10 + php_replace_controlchars_ex(ret->path, p - s);
11 + } else {
12
13 + }
14 }
15 + ...
16 goto label_parse;
17 } else {
18
19 }
20 } else {
21
22 }
23 if (p - s) {
24 tmp___21 = _estrndup(s, (unsigned int )(p - s));
25 ret->path = (char *)tmp___21;
26 php_replace_controlchars_ex(ret->path, p - s);
27 } else {
28
29 }
Figure 6: AE patch for php-bug-309111-309159
1 if (pp && pp < p) {
2 + if (pp - s) {
3 + ret->path = estrndup(s, (pp-s));
4 + php_replace_controlchars_ex(ret->path, (pp - s));
5 + }
6 p = pp;
7 goto label_parse;
8 }
9
10 if (p - s) {
11 ret->path = estrndup(s, (p-s));
12 php_replace_controlchars_ex(ret->path, (p - s));
13 }
14
Figure 7: Developer patch for php-bug-309111-309159
B. KALI CORRECT PATCHES
1 -if (y < 1000) {
2 +if (y < 1000 && !1) {
3 PyObject *accept = PyDict_GetItemString(moddict,
4 "accept2dyear");
5 if (accept != NULL) {
6 int acceptval = PyObject_IsTrue(accept);
7 if (acceptval == -1)
8 return 0;
9 if (acceptval) {
10 if (0 <= y && y < 69)
11 y += 2000;
12 else if (69 <= y && y < 100)
13 y += 1900;
14 else {
15 PyErr_SetString(PyExc_ValueError,
16 "year out of range");
17 return 0;
18 }
19 if (PyErr_WarnEx(PyExc_DeprecationWarning,
20 "Century info guessed for a 2-digit year.", 1) != 0)
21 return 0;
22 }
23 }
24 else
25 return 0;
26 }
27 p->tm_year = y - 1900;
28 p->tm_mon--;
29 p->tm_wday = (p->tm_wday + 1) % 7;
Figure 8: Kali patch for python-bug-69783-69784
1 if (offset >= s1_len) {
2 php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING,
3 "The start position cannot exceed initial string length");
4 RETURN_FALSE;
5 }
6
7 -if (len > s1_len - offset) {
8 +if (len > s1_len - offset && !1) {
9 len = s1_len - offset;
10 }
11
12 cmp_len = (uint) (len ? len : MAX(s2_len, (s1_len - offset)));
Figure 9: Kali patch for php-bug-309892-309910
1 -if (ctx->buf.len) {
2 +if ((ctx->buf.len) || 1) {
3 smart_str_appendl(&ctx->result, ctx->buf.c, ctx->buf.len);
4 smart_str_appendl(&ctx->result, output, output_len);
5
6 *handled_output = ctx->result.c;
7 *handled_output_len = ctx->buf.len + output_len;
8
9 ctx->result.c = NULL;
10 ctx->result.len = 0;
11 smart_str_free(&ctx->buf);
12 } else {
13 *handled_output = NULL;
14 }
Figure 10: Kali patch for php-bug-311346-311348
1 if (ctx->buf.len) {
2 smart_str_appendl(&ctx->result, ctx->buf.c, ctx->buf.len);
3 smart_str_appendl(&ctx->result, output, output_len);
4
5 *handled_output = ctx->result.c;
6 *handled_output_len = ctx->buf.len + output_len;
7
8 ctx->result.c = NULL;
9 ctx->result.len = 0;
10 smart_str_free(&ctx->buf);
11 } else {
12 - *handled_output = NULL;
13 + *handled_output = estrndup(output, *handled_output_len = output_len);
14 }
Figure 11: Developer patch for php-bug-311346-311348

